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In a legislative system such as Turkey’s in which the institutional design favors 
governance over inclusiveness, what role do opposition parties play in the legislative 
process? Previous studies have investigated elite and mass attitudes towards political 
opposition, case studies of individual opposition parties and the institutionalization of the 
party system, but an empirical exploration of the contribution of opposition parties to the 
Turkish policymaking process is lacking. Applying a framework engineered by political 
scientist Frank R. Baumgartner, this thesis quantifies and analyzes general debate in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly and the magnitude of media coverage of these debates 
from 1983 to 2015 in order to gain insight into the tools of political conflict used by 
opposition parties in the Turkish legislative system. This thesis concludes that when the 
forces of political conflict are played out against the backdrop of a not fully 
institutionalized legislative system, subject to a lack of linkages between legislators and 
outside actors, and operating in a less free media climate, Baumgartner’s framework reveals 
an inconsistent picture and the patterns of conflict that are revealed in the Turkish case 
reflect a larger struggle in finding a balance between stability and democracy. 
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ÖZET 
 
MÜZAKERELER VE HALKIN GÜNDEMİ: TÜRK MUHALEFET PARTİLERİ VE 
1983-2015 ARASINDA POLİTİKA GELİŞTİRME SÜREÇLERİ 
 
LISA J. REPPELL 
Master Tezi Haziran 2015 
Danışman: Profesör Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, muhalefet partileri, politik çatışmalar, 
yasama kurumu, demokrasi 
  
Türkiye’nin yapısal tasarımının hükümetin lehine olduğu bir yasama düzeninde, 
yasa yapım sürecinde muhalefet partileri nasıl bir rol oynamaktadırlar? Önceki çalışmalar 
her ne kadar seçkinler ve kitle tutumlarının siyasi muhalefetin üzerine etkisini, bireysel 
muhalefetin durum incelemesini ve siyasi parti sistemlerinin yasalarla güvence altına 
alınmasını inceledilerse de; muhalefet partilerinin Türkiye’deki politikaya etki süreçlerini 
inceleyen deneysel bir çalışma daha önce yapılmamıştır. Frank R. Baumgartner’ın 
geliştirdiği kuramsal tasarımı kullanan bu tez Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’ndeki genel 
görüşmeleri ve  1983’ten 2015’e Meclis’te muhalefet partilerinin Türk yasama sisteminde 
kullandıkları politik çatışmalarının araçlarına bir açılım sağlayarak yaşanan görüşmelerin 
medyada ne ölçüde yer bulduğunu ölçmek ve çözümlemeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu tez 
 Baumgartner’ınyaklaşımı istikrarsız ve dolayısıyla çatışma içeren bir siyasal ortamda 
istikrar ve demokrasi arasında bir denge bulunmaya çalışılırken muhalefetin nasıl çaba 
gösterdiğini çözümlemektedir. Tam kurumsallaştırılmamış bir yasama sistemi ortamında 
politik çatışmaların nasıl şekillendiğini, yasama yapanlar ile dış etkenlerin arasındaki 
bağlantı eksikliğine nasıl maruz bırakıldığını ve medya özgürlüğünün eksik olduğu bir 
ortamda bu sürecin etkisinin olup olmadığını araştırmaya yarar. Türkiye’de de benzer bir 
siyasal çerçeve içinde muhalefetin yasama organını ve genel görüşme olanaklarını 
kullanarak gündemi genişletmeye olan etkisini araştıran bu çalışma, daha önce dikkat 
edilmemiş bir muhalefet işlevini böylece gün yüzüne çıkartmaya yardımcı olmaya 
çalışmıştır.   
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the role of opposition parties in political systems designed to privilege 
governance over inclusiveness? In systems where institutional arrangements do not 
prioritize the input of opposition parties and yet democratic turnover is possible, the 
perception can be that the primary function of the opposition is to criticize the government 
until they succeed in taking power themselves. In systems where policymaking is the 
prerogative of the government or the legislative majority, the inclusion of opposition parties 
in the policymaking process is not a priority.  
Opposition parties, nonetheless, play a dynamic and important role in the 
institutionalization of democratic legislative function that goes beyond providing an 
alternate choice at election time. Even in systems where the political rules leave a restricted 
space for opposition parties to operate, opposition parties play a vital role in maintaining 
and consolidating the health of a nation’s democracy.  
For this reason and others, opposition parties in Turkey have garnered the attention 
of academics. Explorations of opposition politics in Turkey have been approached from the 
angle of political culture. Frederick Frey’s seminal work on elite political culture and 
regime stability provides a cornerstone for the academic literature that touches on issues of 
political opposition.1 His theories on the group cohesion and intolerance towards outsiders 
that characterize the Turkish party system are echoed and explored in writings investigating 
attitudes towards multi-party politics in Turkey. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu picked up this line of 
literature in the 1980s to empirically test its suggestion of intolerance towards multi-party 
politics and political opposition, finding instead that tolerance among political elites and 
masses towards opposition and a multi-party system was fairly widespread.2 Other lines of 
inquiry have included case studies of particular opposition parties,3 and significant attention 
has been given to the nature and institutionalization of the party system itself in Turkey.4 
                                                          
1
 Frey 1965; Frey 1975 
2
 Kalaycıoğlu 1988 
3
 Kiriş 2013 
4
 Hale 2002; Frey 1965; Sayarı 2007; Sayarı 2012 
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What is lacking is a systematic and empirical exploration of the way that opposition 
parties behave and the legislative function they serve in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly during legislative periods.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that Turkey’s electoral 
and legislative institutions accord such little apparent space to the contributions of 
opposition parties, that their influence on the legislative process – much less on the 
policymaking process – is thought to be an unlikely avenue for fruitful inquiry. However, 
frameworks for the investigation of opposition parties’ contributions to the legislative 
process despite political institutions designed to prioritize governance over the inclusion of 
diverse voices in the policymaking process do exist. This thesis will use one such 
framework envisioned by Frank R. Baumgartner in his book Conflict and Rhetoric in 
French Policymaking to investigate the following question: what function do opposition 
parties in Turkey have in the policymaking process?  
Though this is an ambitious question, the modest contribution this thesis hopes to 
make is to fill in a baseline empirical picture of opposition parties’ ability, or lack thereof, 
to use institutionalized political conflict to influence the national political agenda. It will 
examine a period from 1983 to 2015 in order to provide a comparative view of opposition 
parties over time. In doing so, it will investigate whether there is empirical evidence that 
opposition parties are able to fulfill the basic function of bringing issues to the attention of 
the public in a way that has the potential to influence policy perceptions and the direction 
of the political agenda. Furthermore, it will inquire into the methods by which opposition 
parties engage with the policymaking process and what this indicates about the 
institutionalization of democratic legislative function in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA). 
In the following pages, I will argue that when the forces of political conflict are 
played out against the backdrop of a not fully institutionalized legislative system, subject to 
a lack of linkages between legislators and outside actors, and operating in a less free media 
climate, Baumgartner’s framework reveals an inconsistent picture and the patterns of 
conflict that are revealed in the Turkish case reflect a larger struggle with finding the 
balance between stability and democracy. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORY 
Political scientists have given us a variety of ways in which to think of and evaluate 
the contributions of opposition parties to multiparty political systems. The framework set 
forth by Frank R. Baumgartner in his book Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policy Making 
provides a potential means for evaluating the function of Turkish opposition parties that is 
particularly intriguing. 
This work, published in 1989, was Baumgartner’s first book and set the stage for his 
later works exploring the politics of agenda setting. Baumgartner’s scholarship, in 
partnership with others, would later generate an entire avenue of political science inquiry, 
the Policy Agendas Project and the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). The later builds 
upon the United States specific methodology of the former to enable cross-country 
comparisons of issue attention across policy areas and political systems over time. The 
work of the Comparative Agendas Project covers seventeen countries, all consolidated 
democracies. Before expanding his work into this comparative realm, Baumgartner’s 
Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policy Making focused more narrowly on the specifics of a 
single country, asking a series of foundational questions that would in many ways inform 
his later work. Turkey is not a country that is included in the work of the Comparative 
Agendas Project, and whether or not the CAP framework would be applicable it open for 
debate. In attempting to glean insights into the workings of Turkish politics by engaging 
with the literature of agenda setting,5 Baumgartner’s first book provides a valuable starting 
point. 
As the title of the book suggests, his work focuses on the French national context. It 
evaluates policy making in the French Fifth Republic in the late 1980s. Though his book 
has several avenues of inquiry into the French policymaking process, this thesis will focus 
on expanding the framework Baumgartner creates for evaluating political conflict as a tool 
for debate expansion. This section will proceed with a detailed unpacking of Baumgartner’s 
central claims about the nature of the French Fifth Republic and political contestation 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that there are several prominent lines of scholarly inquiry into the politics of agenda 
setting. Baumgartner’s Comparative Agenda’s Project is only one such avenue. For a concise summary of the 
multiple strains of thought on the study of agenda setting, see Baumgartner, B.D Jones and J. Wilkerson 
2011: pp. 950-952. 
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during the period he conducted his research in order to demonstrate its applicability in the 
Turkish context. It will then expand upon the implications for general political conflict as 
well as opposition parties when the Turkish case is viewed through Baumgartner’s 
framework. This section will then set forth a series of claims in the Turkish case that will 
be empirically tested in subsequent chapters by expanding upon Baumgartner’s framework. 
Conflict and Agenda Setting 
 Baumgartner opens his work by asking the question “Why do some issues become 
important societal debates, dominate the national media, and monopolize the attention of 
the nation’s political leaders, whereas other issues are decided by small groups of 
experts?”6 His work is concerned with the mechanisms that shape the political agenda and 
his central contention is that political conflict is the key explanatory factor behind agenda 
setting, not policy scope or content. Conflict is the means by which political actors expand 
debate. His work is built on the understanding that there is a tension between political 
generalists and political specialists. Generalists wish to portray policy issues in the broadest 
terms possible by appealing to ideology, values or any other aspects of an issue upon which 
the general public feels themselves qualified to comment. Specialists, on the other hand, 
wish to minimize public debate by portraying an issue as technical, noncontroversial and 
best understood by experts.  “Depending on the side that prevails in this rhetorical debate 
about the proper characterization of the issue, the question will attract the attention either of 
a large number of policymakers and the mass media or of a small, limited number of 
specialists.”7  
Baumgartner contends that opposition parties are one of the key actors that have a 
vested interest in expanding debate, whereas the interests of governments and parties in 
power are often best served by keeping debate restricted. The introduction of increased 
scrutiny through debate – particularly debate that raises public awareness and outcry – is 
contrary to the government’s goal of forwarding its agenda with minimal friction. A 
primary function of opposition parties is to challenge the government, which therefore 
makes them “natural allies of policy expanders hoping to shift an issue from the specialized 
                                                          
6
 Baumgartner 1989: p. 3 
7
 Ibid.: p. 3 
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to the general political arena.”8 Opposition parties’ interests are best served by expanding 
political debate and oversight as a means to derail the government’s agenda and provide a 
platform from which to criticize the government more broadly.   
Similarities between the French and Turkish Contexts 
 Baumgartner makes no explicit claims about the applicability of his claims in other 
national contexts, though he does suggest that research into the opportunities for expansion 
and contraction in other political systems would be potentially fruitful.9 The scalability of 
his framework and the logic underpinning makes its application in other national contexts 
both a worthy experiment and justifiable. The Turkish case from 1983 to the present is a 
particularly apt fit for Baumgartner’s model, as the French political context from which 
Baumgartner draws his empirical data resembles the Turkish political environment to a 
degree that makes comparison valid. 
 The French Fifth Republic, like the Turkish system under the 1982 Constitutional 
regime, is one in which a strong executive is prioritized and the policymaking role of the 
legislature is limited.10 “In France the concern of the framers of the 1958 constitution was 
more with creating a system that would allow the government to govern despite the deep 
cleavages in society than with allowing for opportunities for minorities to appeal”11 It was a 
system designed to limit opportunities for losers in the policy process to expand debate. 
Baumgartner describes the French policymaking process as one that is dominated by the 
executive branch. The parliamentary agenda is set by the government and legislation, 
Baumgartner says, is generally prepared by the administration and is passed by the 
Parliament without amendment.12  
 The Turkish governing system designed under the auspices of the military regime 
governing the country after the 1980 coup was also designed in a way that gives the 
government the ability to forward its policy agenda with minimal policy input from the 
                                                          
8
 Ibid.: p. 165 
9
 Ibid.: p. 219 
10
  Kalaycıoğlu 1990: pp. 188-191; Kalaycıoğlu 1995: pp. 42-43; Kalaycıoğlu 2008: pp. 17-19; Kalaycıoğlu 
2010: pp. 122-125 
11
 Baumgartner 1989: p. 220 
12
 Ibid.: p. 163 
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legislature. “The decision as to which bills will be taken up is technically a decision of the 
legislature, but in fact the government parties, following the instructions of their leaders, 
determine the agenda.”13 Over much of the past thirty years, the government, through the 
power of their party members in the TGNA, have steered the course of the legislative 
agenda. Writing in 1990, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu characterizes the legislative process as one in 
which the government plays the most significant role in policy making: “The high approval 
rates of the government-sponsored bills, and very low levels of deputy input in the 
legislative process are indicative of the fact that the TGNA after 1983 has veered 
towards…a ‘subordinate’ type of legislature.14   
The government’s dominant role in policymaking can be measured by looking at the 
origin of bills that are eventually passed into law. In both the French Fifth Republic in 
Baumgartner’s time and in the Turkish case, though bills submitted by individual deputies 
are far more common, bills originating from the government are enacted into law with 
much greater frequency.15   
  An additional similarity between the French and Turkish case is the limited human 
resources granted to legislators. As in the Turkish case, French legislators have minimal 
staffs. “Most deputies… indicated relying on a single staff aide for their legislative work 
and on another for their district casework,” which “make it easier for the government and 
the parliamentary majority to control debates….”16 The volume and pace of the legislative 
process is such that without the aid of a larger staff, legislators’ ability to monitor the 
progression of government’s policy agenda is necessarily bounded. This is relevant in that 
is affects deputies’ ability to effectively strategize and engage in timely and well-informed 
legislative debate. Engaging in expansionary tactics is rendered more difficult by the lack 
of staff to support deputies and parties efforts. This is particularly true in the Turkish case 
since constituent services already account for the largest allocation of individual deputies’ 
time.17 Expansionary tactics in a context made more difficult by a lack of staff to aid the 
                                                          
13
 Turan 2003: p. 165 
14
 Kalaycıoğlu 1990: p. 211 
15
 Turan 2003: p. 165; Baumgartner 1989: p. 164 
16
 Baumgartner 1989: p. 165 
17
 Turan 2003: p. 163 
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process are another example of a check on legislator’s ability to challenge the forward push 
of a government’s agenda.  
 It is not just the legislative system that suggests similarities. Baumgartner 
characterizes the French system as one in which all of the institutions surrounding the 
legislature are also focused on governance over inclusion.  
“The dominance of the executive branch over the legislature, the centralized 
administrative structure, the minor role of the courts in most policy 
questions, the tame press, and the great power of the career civil service all 
make it easier for the government and for the administration to get things 
done, but they also allow fewer opportunities for losers in the policy process 
to appeal to outside allies for help”18 
Baumgartner seeks and finds expansionary forces even in a political context where the deck 
is stacked against opposition parties in many ways. Searching for the same expansionary 
forces in the Turkish case, with its similarly stacked deck, becomes an interesting avenue of 
inquiry. 
 
Applying Baumgartner’s Framework 
   These similarities give Baumgartner’s framework the potential to be highly 
revealing in the Turkish case, as his framework is one that is intended to explore the 
function of political parties in a context in which they appear to have little formal or 
procedural power to affect the outcome of policy. Given these similarly bounded legislative 
powers in France and Turkey, Baumgartner’s framework is a potentially profitable tool of 
analysis to use in the Turkish context.  This framework enables the exploration of political 
contestation and the role of opposition parties in a system where their power has been 
intentionally curtailed by the design of the political system.  
Baumgartner asserts that, “the reduced role of the Parliament in making substantive 
and detailed policy decisions creates incentives for the deputies and the senators to 
contribute to the policy process in other ways. Members of Parliament are natural 
expanders of policy debates, and the Parliament as a whole plays its greatest role when it 
                                                          
18
 Baumgartner 1989: p. 220 
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serves as an echo chamber for generating controversy.”19 The Parliament, in serving this 
expansionary purpose, can bring issues into the public’s view and having done so, gives 
added momentum for their inclusion in the national agenda. This, Baumgartner says, gives 
legislators “one of the most important functions in democratic policymaking.”20  
Looking at the phenomenon of political conflict and expansion in the Turkish case 
is an interesting test not only of the function of opposition parties, but is also a means by 
which to evaluate the democratic underpinnings of the policy making process in Turkey. 
Though the policymaking powers of a legislature may be limited, its engagement in the 
policymaking process serves the role of democratic oversight of the government, even if its 
input has minimal ability to drive policy decisions. 
Is the Turkish legislature functioning in a manner consistent with this function of 
democratic oversight? Are the phenomena that Baumgartner observes in the French case 
similarly observable in Turkey? In order to answer these questions, I will set out to test a 
set of empirical claims.  
 First, if Baumgartner’s framework is sound and applicable in the case of Turkey, 
then we should see that opposition parties are utilizing the expansionary tool of debate to a 
significantly greater degree than parties in government and that parties in government are 
attempting to limit debate. 
 Second, we should expect to see that parties change their behaviors of expansion 
and contraction when they switch between opposition and government parties. When 
opposition parties become governing parties, they should switch from expansionary 
behavior to an impulse to contract debate and vice versa.  
Third, if Baumgartner’s framework applies in the Turkish case, we should see a 
correlation between successful expansion of debate and an increase in public awareness of 
the subject under debate.    
                                                          
19
 Ibid.: p. 165 
20
 Ibid.: p. 162 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
Although this thesis is investigating a similar phenomenon as Baumgartner’s above-
explicated work and draws heavily on inspiration from his framework, its motivating 
research question and the length of time under examination are different, which necessarily 
requires an alteration of methodology. Baumgartner was writing with the purpose of 
illuminating something larger about the policymaking process and political conflict, namely 
the expansion and contraction techniques being employed. My purpose is different. It is to 
take what Baumgartner has concluded about legislators’ contribution to democratic 
policymaking and test those conclusions in the Turkish contexts to see if they hold true. The 
analysis of these tests will contribute to an understanding of legislative function, particularly 
the function of opposition parties, and also provide insight into the institutionalization of 
democratic legislative function in Turkey.  
The methodological approach of this thesis maintains the spirit of Baumgartner’s 
empirical tests while necessarily deviating from them in order to look at a longer time 
frame and work with available data. Expanding on Baumgartner’s original framework also 
allows for the investigation of changes over time and policy areas, which was not possible 
in Baumgartner’s exploration of a single policy area over a one year timeframe.   
Debate Data Set 
 The first variable needed is one that can be quantified as a measure of expansionary 
tactics. Like Baumgartner, this thesis uses a measure of legislative debate to represent the 
tactic of expansion. Public debate in the plenary session of a legislature, by nature of the 
visible arena in which it takes place, relies on broadly framing issues in order to maximize 
awareness and highlight objections to proposals or policy. Public debate is not primarily a 
forum for discussing or introducing specific or technical policy changes, particularly in a 
system where a legislature’s ability to amend legislation is highly limited. Debate is a tool 
of expanders, not contractors. A tool of those who wish to push the consideration of a bill 
or idea into the realm of generalists as opposed to those who wish to limit consideration of 
a proposed change to a group of specialists. By quantifying and sampling plenary debate, 
this allows for a measurement of a clear expansionary tactic. 
10 
 
In the Grand National Assembly, there are three distinct types of debate. The first is 
debate related to a specific bill that happens at the committee level, debate that happens 
related to a specific bill at the plenary level, and general debate. General debate is not 
attached to a particular proposal but rather can be introduced on any topic by any party 
group of group of twenty or more deputies directly to the plenary session for consideration. 
It is broadly defined as “the discussion on a certain matter concerning the society and the 
activities of the state held in the Plenary of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.”21 
Upon its proposal, an incident of general debate – hereafter referred to by its Turkish name, 
genel görüşme – is placed on the order paper along with a text explaining the justification 
for introducing the motion for debate. A select number of these tabled motions for debate 
make it onto the Plenary’s agenda and are then subject to preliminary debate in which the 
government and political party groups are given twenty minutes to speak on the topic and 
the deputy who proposed the motion is given ten minutes to speak. After this, a majority 
vote by show of hands is required to hold a full general debate, which then happens 
between forty eight hours and seven days later.22  
For the purposes of my empirical tests, I have chosen to sample genel görüşme. This 
is an obvious methodological difference from Baumgartner, who used a series of elite 
interviews to collect legislator’s perceptions of which debates were of importance and then 
investigated and quantified those debates that were suggested. This was possible because 
Baumgartner was investigating a recent legislative period of less than two years – a period 
in which all of his elite interview subjects were involved in the policymaking process.  
Looking at a longer time frame necessitates finding a way to sample debate across a thirty 
two year period that has a degree of consistency across that period. Genel görüşme is best 
suited these criteria for a number of reasons. 
First, though records of parliamentary debate are public documents freely available in 
print and online there are challenges to ensuring the complete thirty two year record is 
complete. Reports on debate coming out of committee exist, but the format for reporting 
them changed over time and some records are missing from the electronic record. At any 
rate, committee debate is of less interest and continuity regardless of whether or not it is 
                                                          
21
 Rules of Procedure p. 161 
22
 TGNA Website 
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available. Debate of legislation at the plenary level is of such a volume that individual 
analysis of 30 years of debate is not feasible, and the aggregate reporting on quantity and 
subject of debates exists in some cases but is again missing at times and changes format 
over the years.  
Genel görüşme, however, receives a special chronological coding in the legislative 
record. For example, the first genel görüşme introduced in a legislative period is coded 8/1, 
the next 8/2 and so forth. This system makes it possible to deduce when a record is missing 
from an aggregate report of debate. It is then possible to search the volumes of debate 
individually within a specified time frame to find the missing debate. A majority of 
incidents of genel görüşme from the time period 1983 to the present (2015) can be searched 
and sorted via the TGNA’s online database. However, records are only compiled through 
the 23rd Dönem (2011) with a large gap in the 19th Dönem and several smaller gaps in other 
Dönems. Since genel görüşme is clearly and consistently coded, it was possible to go back 
through the records to fill the gaps, and create a record for the 24th Dönem by individually 
searching each volume of the official Journal of Minutes (tutanak dergisi). 
This process resulted in a data set of 267 incidents of proposed, preliminary and fully 
debated genel görüşme from the period 1983 to spring 2015, which represents the period 
running from the beginning of the 17th legislative dönem to the end of the 24th. Of these 267 
incidents of debates, there are 4 missing data points where a gap in the record indicates a 
debate was proposed but no record of it could be found in the individual volumes of the 
minutes.  Each incident was coded with the following information: legislative dönem in 
which the debate occurred, general topic area of the debate, specific topic of the debate, 
proposing deputy, proposing deputy’s electoral province, the deputy’s party affiliation at 
the time of the debate’s proposal, whether that party was a member of the opposition at the 
time of the debate’s proposal and whether or not the debate was proposed (önerge), 
preliminarily debated (öngörüşme) or fully debated (görüşme). 
A second reason for sampling genel görüşme, beyond the fact that it can be used to 
construct a reliable data set, is that genel görüşme is a suitable variable to analyze the 
robustness of Baumgartner’s central ideas in the Turkish context. The goal of analyzing a 
debate variable is to look at parties’ expansionary tactics when they are in and out of 
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power, and genel görüşme is a clear expansionist tactic. A book on the Turkish 
parliamentary process put out by the TGNA describes genel görüşme: “No voting over the 
issue under discussion takes place at the end of the general debate. A general debate only 
provides an opportunity to deputies, government, or party groups to bring particular issues 
of national interest to the attention of the people and express their opinions.”23 The 
Assembly itself describes genel görüşme as a tactic to be used entirely to bring public 
attention to an issue – the very definition of an expansionary tactic. Furthermore, the 
overview of genel görüşme in this TGNA information book is under the “Parliamentary 
Oversight of the Executive” chapter, further highlighting the conception of genel görüşme 
as a tool that is used primarily by the opposition as a legislative check on the executive and 
by extension the governing party or parties.   Others have posited alternate purposes for 
genel görüşme: it may also be a tool a deputy uses to influence the way she is perceived 
within her own party24 or a chance to enter an opinion into the record25, but even these 
alternate motivations are not mutually exclusive with a desire to broaden general awareness 
or alter the framing of an issue under debate.  Baumgartner’s theories regarding 
opposition’s role as expanders of debate and governing parties’ preference for contraction 
can therefore be justifiably tested by an empirical analysis of incidents of genel görüşme. 
There are potential objections to the use of genel görüşme. One such objection 
could be that genel görüşme, since it requires a majority vote to be accepted for debate in 
the plenary session, cannot be an effective tool of the opposition since the governing party 
or coalition of parties could block any proposal of debate. This only strengthens genel 
görüşme as a test of the concepts under investigation, as it is an illustration of the 
functioning of the legislature subordinate to the governing party – steered by the executive 
– that is most interesting for us to look at, and is what Baumgartner was looking at. Given 
that genel görüşme is one of the constitutionally provided procedures given to parties to 
exercise a legislative check on the power of the executive, it becomes even more important 
to investigate. Whether or not parties are behaving in the way that would be predicted has 
implications for the institutionalization and democratic functioning of the legislature. 
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 Erdem 2012: p. 99  
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 Frey 1965: p. 313-316; Turan 2003: p. 163 
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 This was suggested by deputies in interviews 
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Another potential objection is that genel görüşme is ostensibly independent of the 
policymaking process. It is not associated with any particular policy proposal, but rather a 
general opportunity to discuss an issue that is considered relevant to the time. Since 
Baumgartner’s focus is debate and rhetoric in French policymaking, sampling a type of 
debate not directly associated with policymaking could be questioned. However, 
Baumgartner’s claims about the policymaking process are built upon a predicted behavior 
pattern of parties – their ability to affect the policymaking process is a result of their being 
able effectively expand debate, garner public attention, and then wield that added public 
attention to force policy concessions. This project looks at only a part of that process – 
namely, are parties engaging in debate and do those debates enhance public awareness of 
the issue being debated – essentially the first steps necessary to having any input in the 
policymaking process through the means Baumgartner describes. Extending the analysis as 
Baumgartner does to look at how these expansionary tactics are able to influence policy is 
beyond the scope of the empirical analysis of this thesis, though it would be a natural 
extension. Analysis of the data does hint at some likely implications for what expansion 
means for policymaking in the Turkish case, though conclusions in this area are necessarily 
tenuous. However, even Baumgartner cautions his readers’ on the scope of his project, 
stating that, “It is important not to overstate the policy role of the legislature in the Fifth 
Republic.”26 That is the point – of his project and of mine – given a context where the 
legislature is not a driving force in policy formation, what purpose do they serve? In this 
way, genel görüşme’s independence from any specific policy-making mechanism is 
justifiable.  
Furthermore, the use of genel görüşme over a thirty year time period has advantages 
that Baumgartner’s limited time frame did not allow for. Namely, comparison of 
expansionary tactics over a lengthier time period which allows for the investigation of how 
expansionary tactics differ in coalition and government party periods, as well as insight into 
which topics over time are favored by opposition parties and government parties. 
Baumgartner’s investigation was limited only to education policy; sampling genel görüşme 
opens up an line of questioning that was not possible with Baumgartner’s data by allowing 
us to explore the question of which policy topics are seen by opposition parties as the most 
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 Baumgartner 1989: p. 185 
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easily expanded. Additionally, if the government is proposing debate, which topics do they 
think are worthy enough to justify bringing added public attention, which topics do they 
think they can win, or justifies the risk of opening them up for opposition party and public 
scrutiny. 
 
Media Sample Data Set 
 As expansion is characterized as a tool by which a political party or actor brings 
added public attention to a particular issue, a quantifiable measure to act as a proxy for 
degree of public awareness is needed. Absent the existence of any other data set measuring 
public awareness of debate in the Assembly over the time period under investigation, media 
coverage of legislative activities can be used as a proxy indicator for the information that 
the public has access to and which influences their awareness. Though Baumgartner notes 
in his own measurement of newspaper coverage as a measure of public awareness, this 
coverage is not “by itself sufficient to indicate increased public awareness of or interest in 
the topic,”27 it is still useful. Measurement in shifts in magnitude of coverage between 
incidents of debate can serve to indicate which debates received more and less public 
awareness, as opposed to attempting to quantify a degree of interest for any one case. It is a 
comparative measure of awareness across multiple incidents of debate as opposed to any 
sort of absolute measure of awareness in any one particular incident of debate. 
 Furthermore, the media is a necessary intermediary in communicating legislative 
activities to the public. Without media, only activist citizens  taking the initiative to educate 
themselves could find out the workings of the TGNA, a task made more possible be the 
digitalization of the TGNA’s proceedings in the 1990s, but by no means widespread. 
Measuring media coverage, therefore, does not necessarily indicate that the public is aware. 
However, a lack of media coverage is a definite indicator that the public is not aware. In 
this way, a quantification of media coverage is intended to demonstrate the possibility or 
likelihood that the public is more or less aware.  If there is no media coverage, there is very 
little possibility that the public is aware of political actors’ expansionary efforts. 
                                                          
27
 Ibid.: pp. 175-176 
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 Of the 267 incidents of proposed genel görüşme over the period since 1983, twenty 
nine of those debates passed beyond preliminary debate and were fully debated in the 
plenary session. Since some of these twenty nine incidents were on similar topics that were 
later group and debated together, there are seventeen separate dates upon which a full genel 
görüşme occurred in the plenary session. I measured corresponding newspaper coverage for 
all seventeen debates. This created a complete and descriptive data set that could be 
investigated in its entirety without having to justify sampling a subset of debates. Incidents 
of fully debated genel görüşme should in theory also be the most impactful and likely to 
garner media attention.28 
 The question of which newspapers to sample was one that required consideration. 
There are a prolific number of Turkish dailies catering to different ideological positions and 
changes in ownership and editorial staff can result in those ideological positions shifting 
over a time. Sampling any one paper would give an incomplete view of what the broader 
media picture might look like in regards to portrayal of legislative activities. If a paper has 
a political leaning that favors a particular party in or out of power, their coverage of the 
nature and, indeed the existence, of an incident of debate could be skewed. For this reason, 
throughout the period in question, the coverage of two ideologically disparate newspapers 
were sampled. Throughout the period, Milliyet newspaper was sampled. I analyzed 
Tercüman newspaper from 1983 until it went out of print in 1993 and analyzed Zaman 
daily from 1993 until the present. Though I do not mean to claim that these papers 
represent the entire political spectrum, I do contend that they represent different portions of 
the political spectrum and therefore have different biases and ideological skews. In this 
way, if a paper would have ideological motivations for limiting their coverage of a debate, 
a second paper with different ideological motivations would be less likely to skew their 
coverage in an identical way that would obfuscate legislative activities otherwise deemed 
newsworthy. 
Milliyet is digitized from 1950 to the present. A keyword search for “genel 
görüşme” and “TBMM” were run for each instance of debate over a five day period 
covering the two days before the debate until two days after the debate. Different keyword 
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 This method of sampling “high impact” legislative sessions is one that has precedence elsewhere. See 
Loizides 2009: p. 282 
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combinations were used, including combinations of “Turk Büyük Milliyet Meclis”, 
”Meclis”,  “görüşme” and a keyword from the topic of the debate in question. Though some 
combinations resulted in a broader array of returned results, it did not result in relevant 
content that was otherwise excluded from a key word search limited to “genel görüşme” 
and “TBMM,” so I proceeded with the two word keyword search. All relevant results were 
then checked to ensure that the article’s content covered the debate in question, and those 
that were not relevant were discarded.  
Tercüman is not digitized. I created a keyword search similar to the one I had used 
to search Milliyet in order to maintain continuity. I did so by using the relevant results I had 
gathered from Milliyet to reverse-engineer a manual keyword search that would turn up all 
relevant results. I searched Tercüman headlines and sub-headlines for any one of the words 
“Meclis,” “TBMM,” “görüşme,” “tartişma,” a debate topic keyword, or any political party 
name. If the headline contained any of these words I then searched the first one or two 
paragraphs for a second of any of these words. If none of the words showed up in the first 
few paragraphs, I moved on. If the opening did contain multiple words, I scanned though 
the entire article and included it if relevant. Since the pieces of most columnists (köşe 
yazarları) lacked headlines of more than a few words, I scanned the first one to two 
paragraphs for keywords to decide if the article was worth pursuing in more detail. 
Additionally, I restricted the date range to a three day range instead of the five day range I 
had used to search the digitized archives of Milliyet. In my Milliyet search, only one 
relevant result fell outside of a 3 day date range. Given the labor involved in searching each 
page of each day’s paper, I therefore justified narrowing my search to include a date range 
from one day prior to the debate to one day after. 
Zaman is digitalized from 1995 to the present day. I used the same procedure as I 
used for Tercüman to scan the Zaman coverage between 1993 and 1995 and the same 
procedure as I used for Milliyet from 1995 to the present. 
Each result was quantified in number of words. If an article appeared on the front 
page of the newspaper, I multiplied the word count value by three. If the story was 
accompanied by a picture (excluding columnist headshots), I multiplied the word count 
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value by two. The result is numerical score of weighted words of newspaper coverage per 
debate. 
The last quantifiable variable was also the easiest to obtain. This was the length of 
debate in the TGNA quantified in pages of debate in the Journal of Minutes. This value is 
given along each summarized entry of each genel görüşme in the Journal of Minutes, and in 
each online entry. 
 
Interviews 
 I conducted interviews with seven current and former TGNA deputies in Ankara on 
March 2-4 and April 2, 2015. Six of the deputies were opposition party members serving in 
the current 24th Dönem. Four were representatives of the main opposition Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), one of whom was a deputy group chairman (grup başkanvekili) in 
the party leadership of the CHP. Two were representatives of the opposition Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP), one of whom was previously a member of the governing Justice 
and Development Party (AK Party). The other was a designated spokesperson for the MHP. 
One interview was with a retired Motherland Party (ANAP) deputy who served in the 19th 
and 20th legislative periods in addition to serving as a deputy in legislatures prior to the 
period under investigation in this study. During this deputy’s time in the TGNA, ANAP 
switched between opposition party and coalition partner multiple times.  
These interviews are not in any way a representative sample of deputies for the 
period under consideration in this thesis. In particular, there is a heavy bias towards the 
legislative practices of the most recent legislative periods under the party government of the 
Justice and Development Party (AK Party). However, the interviews are intended to 
provide an additional check on my empirical findings and subsequent conclusions. Since 
these interviews do not constitute sufficient data to be brought in as a separate data set, the 
deputies’ insights and opinions are brought in at relevant points in the analysis section of 
this paper, both when their views corroborate the data and when their views of legislative 
functions appear to differ from what the data indicates. At all points I have tried to make it 
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apparent that these are statements of individual deputies and influenced by their own 
opinions and objectives, as opposed to definitive statements of facts. 
I conducted free form interviews based on a general set of questions. Though each 
interview progressed along its own course, the basic set of questions can be seen in 
Appendix A. The interviews varied in length from twenty minutes to fifty minutes. Five 
were conducted in English, two in Turkish. Since most deputies do not speak sufficient 
English to give interviews in this language, this also introduces an additional bias. Three of 
the deputies interviewed completed PhD studies in the United States and one in Austria. 
Both Turkish interviews were transcribed in Turkish and then translated with the assistance 
of a certified translator.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA ANALYSIS 
As outlined at the end of chapter one, if Baumgartner’s assertions regarding 
opposition parties’ role and interest in expanding public discourse are correct, then there are 
expectations about how opposition parties will behave in a legislative context. By applying 
these basic assumptions to the Turkish case, one can test the applicability of Baumgartner’s 
framework for the Turkish case. If Turkey deviates drastically from the expectations of 
Baumgartner’s basic assumptions, then it would not be logically sound to further compare 
the Turkish case to his framework. 
Debate Proposed by Opposition Parties versus Governing Parties 
One of the most basic and foundational conclusion of Baumgartner’s work is that 
opposition parties use parliamentary debate as an avenue to introduce conflict into the 
policymaking process, challenge the government, and gain public awareness of the issue 
under debate. The government, conversely, has a vested interest in minimizing debate. As a 
general rule, expanding political debate is dangerous for the government’s agenda. The 
government, particularly a single party government that has sufficient votes to ensure the 
passage of its legislative proposals, has little to gain from inviting the acrimony of debate. 
Debate gives opposition parties the opportunity to challenge the government and question 
the ideas, abilities or intentions of those in power in a public and officially recognized 
capacity.  
 To this end, it would be expected that opposition parties in a democratically 
functioning legislative system would introduce motions for debate at a much higher rate 
than a governing party. Examining incidents of genel görüşme in the Turkish context, this 
pattern holds true. 
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Figure 3.1: Debate proposed by opposition vs. governing party by dönem 
 
This graph shows that the Turkish legislature is following the expected pattern and 
that opposition parties are introducing debate at a much higher rate than the government, in 
every legislative period.  In every dönem, regardless of the overall number of times debate 
is proposed, the ratio of opposition-proposed debate to government-proposed debate is 
much greater. This implies that Baumgartner’s most basic conclusion holds true in the 
Turkish case. Opposition parties are proposing debate with a view to expand the 
conversation and challenge the government. Governing parties propose debate at a much 
lower rate.  
 
Proposed, Preliminary and Fully Debated Genel Görüşme 
It would also be expected that opposition proposals for debate would be rarely taken 
up for full debate by the plenary. The government’s interests would be best served by not 
allowing extensive debate, and their superior numbers should mean that they can 
successfully block the opposition from debating proposals most or all of the time. 
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  Proposing a debate requires only twenty signatures, which is a feat that can be 
achieved by any party group. Proposing debate means that the proposing deputies’ names 
and a one to two page summary of the debate proposal are printed in the Order Paper which 
is published each sitting day of the Assembly. In order for the proposal to make it to the 
plenary for preliminary debate, the Board of Spokespersons must put it on the plenary 
agenda. The Board of Spokespersons is chaired by the Speaker or a vice-speaker from the 
governing party and the chairpersons of the political party groups or their representative.  
Debate proposals can therefore be obstructed at the level of the Board of Spokespersons so 
that they never make it onto the plenary agenda or if they do go to preliminary debate, a 
majority vote is required to pass on to a full debate, which means any proposed debate 
could be blocked by the majority party.  
Figure 3.2: Proposed, preliminary and fully debated genel görüşme by dönem 
 
 
As expected, full debate requires a majority of deputies and therefore can be easily 
blocked by any governing party. Turkey once again adheres to this pattern. 
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In the 17th, 18th and 23rd Dönem no proposals made it past the proposal stage. In the 
20th, 21st, 22nd and 24th Dönem the majority of proposed debate did not even go to 
preliminary debate. Only the 19th Dönem is an outlier, with approximately equal 
distribution between proposed, preliminary and fully debated genel görüşme. Indeed, a 
plurality of genel görüşme examples went to full debate in the plenary. The case of the 19th 
Dönem will be explored in more detail in a later section. 
This picture reveals a lack of a consistent pattern across periods. Genel görüşme has 
changed in terms of legislative importance and function. Under the ANAP party 
government, genel görüşme was proposed, but did not go even once to preliminary debate. 
Possible hypotheses as to why this might be the case include that the government was in 
full control of the operations of the Board of Spokespersons at this period. Though the 
Board of Spokespersons is defined as a body designed to reach consensus among political 
parties regarding the participation in legislative activities including setting and changing the 
Plenary’s agenda,29 in practice the governing party has greater influence through the 
chairmanship of the Board of Spokesperson and also because a lack of consensus among 
the members of the Board is resolved by taking the issue to the plenary for a majority vote, 
where the governing party or majority coalition has sufficient votes to proceed as they 
wish. The lack of preliminary or full debate could also mean that party leaders were not 
willing to expend effort to move genel görüşme to preliminary debate based on any number 
of strategic considerations, including a lack of belief in the value of genel görüşme as a 
legislative strategy. It may be that the mere proposal of genel görüşme served the purposes 
of whichever deputy or party group proposed it: proposing genel görüşme causes the debate 
summary, which is often an outline of the proposing deputies beliefs on the issue, to be 
included in the Order Papers and become part of the official record. Merely proposing 
debate is a way to put forward an opinion or raise an objection and have it officially noted. 
In legislative periods in which a coalition government is in power, the 19th Dönem 
through the 21st Dönem, preliminary and full debates began occurring in significant 
numbers. This is a marked difference from the party government period before in which 
there were no genel görüşme that proceeded beyond the initial proposal stage. In general, 
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the rate of preliminary and full debates during the coalition legislative periods is 
significantly greater than the rate during party government periods.  The increase in 
preliminary and full genel görüşme indicates that opposition parties had more opportunities 
and ability to participate in the legislative process in coalition periods than in party 
government periods.  
The proliferation of genel görüşme during the coalition legislative periods suggests 
that in comparison with the periods before, the governing parties lacked the ability to 
control the legislative agenda to the degree that ANAP was able to in the 17th and 18th 
Dönem. If the coalition partners had coordinated and been in agreement, they would have 
possessed sufficient numbers to suppress genel görüşme at the Board of Spokespersons 
level prior to preliminary debate, or in the plenary to block a preliminary debate from 
becoming a full debate. The apparent lack of success in suppressing genel görüşme, 
corroborates other accounts of this period as one in which coalition partners were not in 
great accord. Ilter Turan observes that the fragmented party system of the time created 
pressures for political parties to adopt strategies aimed at maintaining their vote share and 
keeping their deputies from switching parties. “The imperatives of such a situation dictate 
parliamentary strategies that include somewhat overtly hostile relations with rival parties 
even when they may be partners in the same coalition. In this way, group cohesion may be 
maintained while the voters are sent signals to distinguish between what looks like a set of 
similar parties.”30 Parties within a coalition had strategic interests that put them in conflict 
with one another, and in light of this conflict between governing parties, opposition parties 
had more opportunities to further their own strategic interests. 
The 19th Dönem, as mentioned above, is an unusual case. The surge in debates that 
went to both preliminary and full debate suggests lack of control by government over the 
legislative process. The operation of the Assembly during the 19th Dönem, which began in 
1991, appears to be a break with the way in which the TGNA had operated in the past. 
Kalaycıoğlu, writing in 1995, observes “[d]efinitely, the influence of the TGNA in policy-
making is greater now than it used to be.” He notes that the TGNA, acting on the declared 
political goals of the governing DYP/SHP coalition is functioning in a way to “slow down 
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or halt legislation pertaining to political reform,” leading to a mounting of tensions between 
the TGNA and executive. “Consequently, it looks as if the 1991 Parliament is a more 
autonomous body, which functions with greater effectiveness than previous Parliaments…. 
It seems as if the Government wields less control over the TGNA than any previous 
Government of the 1970s or 1980s.”31 The surge in debate in the 19th Dönem supports this 
analysis. Debate, as an expansionary strategy is also a strategy of obstruction. If both the 
opposition and the governing parties had an interest in slowing down the legislative agenda 
of the executive, then both would be inclined to use debate as a tactic to do so. In this 
period in which incidents of debate spike, proposed debate from non-opposition parties is 
higher than in any other dönem in the thirty two year period under observation.  
This obstructionist tendency does appear to decrease over the next legislative 
periods, suggesting that the government again gains greater control over the activities of the 
legislature and the loyalty of the governing parties to the government’s agenda. There is a 
substantial decrease in rate of proposed, preliminary and fully debated genel görüşme 
between the 19th and 20th Dönem, and another slight decrease from the 20th to the 21st. This 
suggests an increasing ability on the part of the government to limit debate.  
The rate of genel görüşme proposals during the most recent three legislative periods 
indicates that general debate’s role has changed over the AK Party’s time in power as well. 
There is a steady decrease in incidents of introducing genel görüşme over the three 
legislative periods. Furthermore, the tactics of both the governing party and opposition 
parties appear to change over this time period. Referring back to figure 3.1, the AK Party 
proposed debate ten times in their first legislative period in power. Indeed, the single 
incident of full debate that has thus far occurred at any time under the AK Party’s 
government was proposed by then prime minister and leader of the AK Party, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. This suggests that in their first term in power, the governing party was not 
adhering to a pattern that Baumgartner’s framework would predict. The governing party 
had an interest other than contracting political debate in the interests of moving forward 
their political agenda with as little public attention during the legislative process as 
possible.  
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Behavior Changes In and Out of Opposition  
Another observable result of Baumgartner’s theory is that parties should change 
behavior when they change from being a governing party to an opposition party. In order to 
investigate this phenomenon more closely I analyze the behavior of three parties during a 
period in which they each switched between government and opposition at least twice. 
When debate-proposal rates of ANAP, DYP and RP/FP (FP takes up the mantle of the RP 
after it is banned in 1998) are quantified and divided by each party’s time in and out of 
opposition, the data reveals that they do behave as Baumgartner’s framework would 
suggest. Since parties’ times in and out of power varied in length, the ratio of debates 
proposed to months in office is used to standardize the rate of proposal across parties and 
periods. This enables the behavior of parties to be compared in terms of magnitude, though 
in real terms the numbers appear small. 
 
Figure 3.3: Debate proposal rate in government versus opposition 
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 ANAP’s behavior very clearly adheres to the predicted pattern. During the 18th 
Dönem when ANAP was the governing party, ANAP proposed genel görüşme at an 
average rate of 0.106 debates a month. In the subsequent Dönem when ANAP was in the 
opposition, that rate of proposal tripled to an average of 0.302 debates per month. During 
the 20th Dönem, ANAP was in power for 23 months and in opposition for 16 months. Their 
rate of debate proposal in the 20th Dönem was 5 times higher when they were in opposition 
as when they were not. When they were part of the governing coalition in the 21st Dönem, 
their debate proposal rate dropped to the lowest of any time in the period in question to an 
average of .047 debates proposed per month.  
 DYP’s behavior also adheres to the pattern, if a little less perfectly than ANAP’s 
does. In the 18 Dönem when they are in the opposition, DYP proposes genel görüşme at a 
rate of 0.489 debates per month – which is nearly five times higher than the rate at which 
the governing party ANAP was proposing debate during the same time period. When DYP 
is part of the governing coalition in the 19th Dönem, their rate of debate proposal drops by 
two thirds. Given the dynamics of the 19th Dönem discussed above, DYP was still 
introducing genel görüşme at a rate higher than other governing parties during prior and 
subsequent legislative periods. During the 20th Dönem, DYP spent 18 months as part of a 
governing coalition and 21 months in opposition. Its rate of genel görüşme proposal while 
it is in opposition during this period is three times higher than when it was a governing 
party, though in real terms its rate of proposal while in opposition is similar to its rate of 
proposal while in government in the previous dönem. It maintains the same magnitude of 
proposal rate in opposition in the 21st Dönem as it did in opposition in the 20th Dönem. 
 The RP proposes debate at the highest rate of the three parties across the four 
legislative periods in question. The RP is not in existence during the 18th Dönem. When it 
becomes a party in the 19th Dönem, as an opposition party it averages a rate of 0.491 genel 
görüşme proposals per month. In the 20th Dönem, the RP is in a governing coalition for 
eleven months and in opposition for twenty eight months. During this Dönem the RP is 
banned, and it’s behavior in opposition is looked at in combination with the behavior of the 
FP. The RP/FP proposes debate forty percent less often in opposition than they do as a 
governing party. Though this ratio is not as stark as for ANAP and DYP, it is more stark 
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than it appears – in real terms, RP proposed genel görüşme only four times in the eleven 
months it was part of the governing coalition. Three of those proposals came in the first two 
weeks of their time in government. It appears that the RP quickly changed their behavior 
after those initial weeks in power and proposed genel görüşme only one other time in their 
remaining ten months as part of the governing coalition. In the 21st Dönem as an opposition 
party, the FP continues with their predecessor’s comparatively high rate of genel görüşme 
proposal while out of power, with an average proposal rate of 0.419 debates per month. 
 This test clearly confirms the hypothesis that debate is a tool more often used by 
opposition parties than by governing parties. Parties, even when they are switching between 
opposition and government multiple times and relatively quickly, adapt their behavior to 
suit the strategic interest of expanding debate while in the opposition. They propose debate 
much less frequently while a governing party than they do while in opposition. 
 
Topics of Debate  
The data also reveal a number of interesting findings outside of the scope of 
Baumgartner’s investigation, which was limited to a study of education policy. Analyzing 
genel görüşme allows for a picture of which topics or policy issues are most frequently the 
subject of debate.32 This in turn allows us to explore whether parties deem particular policy 
areas to be more apt for expansion through debate. 
In the 17th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd legislative periods, foreign policy issues were the 
most commonly proposed issues for genel görüşme. The spike in foreign policy related 
genel görüşme proposals in the 19th Dönem is particularly dramatic. A significant factor in 
this spike was the propensity for multiple proposals on the same topic to be introduced 
concurrently, each by a member of a different opposition party. For example, five deputies 
from four different 19th Dönem opposition parties (one each from ANAP, MÇP, DSP and 
two from RP) proposed a genel görüşme on current events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
                                                          
32
 I created my own categorizations based on the specific topics of debate. At times, the classification was 
subject to interpretation, for example a debate on the EU Customs Union could be classified as either an 
economic or a foreign policy issue. In these cases I chose whichever one category I thought best described the 
topic. Domestic topics include all non-security and non-economic issues related to domestic policy. 
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is accounted for as five separate proposals for debate. When one of these topics would 
make it to the plenary for full debate, the proposals were combined and debated together. 
This practice is not limited to foreign policy proposals, but in the 19th Dönem this was the 
case for genel görüşme proposals relating to Chechnya, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Armenia the 
Caucuses and accounts in large part for the very visible spike. The most interesting 
implication of these concurrent proposals is that it indicates a level of coordination or at 
least mimicry among opposition parties. In some cases different opposition parties put 
forward a motion for genel görüşme on the same topic published in the same day’s Order 
Papers, on some topics one opposition party will propose debate on a topic and other 
opposition parties will follow with motions for debate on the same topic at a later date.  
 
Figure 3.4: Topics of debate by dönem 
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This practice of concurrent or imitative proposals from multiple opposition parties 
continues in later legislative periods as well, though to a slightly lesser extent. At times, all 
parties, including the governing party will put forth a similar topic for debate. For example, 
the first four proposals at the opening of the 24th Dönem we on the same topic, one 
proposal each from all four party groups, including the governing AK Party. The CHP, 
MHP and AKP phrasing their proposals as debate concerning an “increase in acts of 
terror,” and the Kurdish issue-focused BDP phrasing their proposal as a discussion of “the 
Kurdish issue.” The proposals then were preliminarily debated in a closed legislative 
session.  
Domestic issues were the most often proposed in the 18th Dönem by a significant 
margin, and narrowly edge out foreign policy proposals in the 20th and 23rd Dönem. 
The 24th Dönem is the only legislative period in which a topic other than Foreign 
Policy or Domestic Issues received the most proposals. In this case security was the most 
common proposal area. However, this is due to the concurrent proposals to debate increases 
in terror activities/the Kurdish question mentioned above.  These four proposals accounted 
for the majority of the five total security-related debate topics introduced, and almost half 
of all debates introduced across all four topic areas in the 24 Dönem. 
 
Topics Preferred by Government versus by Opposition  
While an examination of the topics most frequently proposed provides insight into 
debate expansion more generally, a more interesting question is how does the behavior of 
opposition parties and governing parties differ when broken out by topic. Looking at the 
data in this way allows insight into which types of issues the opposition might view as most 
conducive to expansion, and which issues the governing parties might think are most 
winnable and worth the risk of attracting attention. 
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Figure 3.5: Topics preferred by government parties versus opposition parties 
 
Foreign policy accounts for the largest share of proposed debate for both opposition 
and governing parties, and to a similar order of magnitude – 43.1 percent of all genel 
görüşme proposals coming from governing parties and 39.8 percent coming from 
opposition parties.  
The higher rate of genel görüşme proposal in the area of foreign policy suggests that 
both opposition parties and governing parties view this issue area as one that is winnable in 
the public sphere. One opposition party deputy who joined the TGNA after decades in the 
foreign service speculated on the difference between foreign policy debates and debates on 
other topics:   
[F]oreign policy issues have a different status…. [In the past] foreign policy 
was pursued in a narrow corridor – by the government, Prime Minister – the 
opposition wasn’t terribly interested in foreign policy as a result of either 
negligence or a broad background consensus on these issues. And a public 
that wasn’t terribly interested, and a media that wasn’t terribly interested in 
foreign policy issues. Now it has changed, foreign policy has become a 
bread and butter issue, a part of the domestic debate. 
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This analysis does not entirely concur with the data; opposition parties do appear interested 
enough in foreign policy for it to compose a plurality of its debate proposals. However, this 
notion of foreign policy playing a shifting role in how the government seeks to influence 
public sentiment at home can be one explanation for the reason why a government would 
wish to bring attention and expand debate on foreign policy issues. If foreign policy is 
viewed by the public as less relevant to their daily lives and potentially something best left 
to the government, expanding public debate and awareness of foreign policy issues and 
thus crafting the way the government’s foreign policy actions are perceived domestically, 
can be in the best interests of the government.  
In regards to other issue areas, opposition parties are half as likely as a governing 
parties to propose debate about a security issue. This means that for governing parties, 
foreign policy and security together account for nearly seventy percent of all genel görüşme 
proposed. This suggests governing parties have less interest in contracting debate of foreign 
policy and security issues. Since foreign policy and security issues are largely interrelated 
with the actions of other actors, policy on these issues is often reactionary – debate is 
proposed in response to a specific terror event or conflict in neighboring states for example. 
In these instances, the government’s actions or response are less likely to be part of a 
coherent policy agenda intended to forward their interests and more about shaping the 
public’s perception of their handling of an unfolding event. 
Conversely, economic and domestic issues are the areas in which the government is 
likely to have an agenda which it is attempting to forward. In which case, keeping debate 
contracted and trying to forward that agenda while minimizing legislative friction and 
public awareness prior to passage is more likely to be in the government’s best interests. 
Indeed, the data does provide some support to this theory: opposition parties are twice as 
likely to propose debate about the economy as a governing party. Proposals on domestic 
issues account for 31.3 percent of opposition genel görüşme proposals compared to 23.5 
percent government parties’ proposals. 
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Media Sample 
 Thus far, unpacking the debate data set has enabled us to test two of the three 
empirical claims laid out as a test of Baumgartner’s framework in the Turkish context. We 
have shown that yes, we do see that opposition parties are utilizing the expansionary tool of 
debate to a significantly greater degree than parties and government and also that in periods 
where the government is unified enough to do so, they are acting to limit debate, as 
evidenced by small number of debates that pass on to be fully debated in the plenary.  
We have also tested the second empirical claim and showed that parties do indeed 
change their behaviors of expansion and contraction when the switch between the 
opposition and government parties. When parties are in opposition, they propose debate at a 
significantly higher rate than when they are a party government or a member of a coalition 
government. 
Beyond testing Baumgartner’s framework, we have also been able to empirically 
examine which topics of debate are most closely associated with opposition and 
government party strategies of expansion, and how those strategies of expansion differ by 
topic according to whether the proposing party is in opposition or not.  
  Analyzing the debate data set on its own has enabled the testing of these first two 
empirical claims and the additional exploration of topics of debate. In order to test the third 
claim, that of public awareness as a result of debate, additional data must be brought in. 
The third and final empirical claim is that if Baumgartner’s framework applies in the 
Turkish case, we should see a correlation between successful expansion of debate and an 
increase in public awareness of the subject under debate.  As outlined in the methodology, 
media coverage is being measured as a proxy for public awareness. Media coverage in 
multiple newspapers from 1983 to the present has been quantified for all fully-debated 
incidents of genel görüşme in that time period.  
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Figure 3.6 Magnitude of media coverage of all fully debated genel görüşme 1983 - 2015 
 
 
Quantifying news coverage in this way makes it apparent that the attention allocated 
to individual debates is highly varied. Seven out of seventeen debates received zero media 
coverage in the newspapers sampled. Five debates received a measure of coverage well 
above the mean of 1,368 words (weighted) of coverage per instance of debate. Five debates 
received some measure of coverage, but at a rate well below the mean. The variation of 
coverage suggests that the media’s role in expanding public awareness is not uniform or 
consistent. The occurrence of debate in and of itself is not enough to garner media attention 
and by extension public awareness.  
Of the five debates that received significant attention, three were proposed by the 
opposition. Two were proposed by the government: the instance of genel görüşme debated 
in July of 1996 was proposed by then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The genel 
görüşme debated in May of 2003 was proposed by then Prime Minister Erdoğan. Since 
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the proposal of these debates was at the initiative of the government, not from any wayward 
impulse of the governing party in defiance of the executive. 
 However, there are also instances of proposed debate coming from the governing 
party that received no media coverage in the newspapers sampled. However, of the four 
other debates proposed by non-opposition parties that received little or no coverage, none 
were proposed by the head of the government, rather they were proposed by a member of 
the governing party. 
 The media coverage in the different newspapers sampled is also comparatively 
equal. This suggests that judgment of what legislative activity is newsworthy was similar at 
all three newspapers regardless of their overall editorial directions. 
Length of Debate 
The time allocated for genel görüşme is prescribed in the rules of procedure, however, 
debates do still differ in length. Though all incidents of genel görüşme examined in this 
study were completed in one legislative sitting, the number of pages in the transcript 
reflecting the extent to which each issue was debated do differ. 
The average length of debate is 41.6 pages, the shortest debate was 21 pages long 
and the longest debate almost four times as long at 80 pages. Four incidents of debate 
exceed the average significantly. The length of these debates pulls the average length 
considerably higher than it would otherwise be, meaning that 13 of the debates fall below 
the average length of debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Figure 3.7 Length of debate for all fully debated genel görüşme 1983 - 2015 
 
 
 
 
Length of Debate in Relation to Media Coverage 
Overlaying the two figures reveals a strong correlation between length of debate and 
the amount of newspaper coverage it receives.  
The four spikes in debate length correspond with four of the five incidents of genel 
görüşme that received the largest amount of media coverage. The only exception to this 
correlation is the genel görüşme which occurred in May of 2003 when despite the length of 
debate being below average, media coverage still spiked.  
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Figure 3.8: Length of debate in comparison to magnitude of media coverage 
 
Absent alternate explanations, it appears that when the TGNA debates a topic for a 
longer period of time, newspapers are more inclined to write about it. Granted, the topics 
that may stretch into longer debates may be more acrimonious and politically visible issues 
that the media would be more inclined to cover regardless, but since media coverage was 
measured based on articles that referred to the specific incident of genel görüşme, not just 
general media coverage of the same topic of the debate, the spikes are in direct coverage of 
the legislative process and the actions and arguments of deputies, as well as the context of 
the political environment in which the debate occurs.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION 
 This project has investigated one portion of Baumgartner’s theory on the expansion 
and contraction of policy issues in legislative contexts. It explored whether opposition 
parties are acting in the expansionary way that would be predicted by Baumgartner’s 
framework and, conversely, are parties in government acting to limit expansion. 
An examination of the expansionary tactic of general debate in the TGNA over a 32 
year period reveals that incidents of genel görüşme increased from the 17th to the 18th 
Dönem, reached their peak in the 19th Dönem, declined slightly and then remained at a 
steady rate across the 20th, 21st and 22nd legislative periods. The rate of proposal then 
tapered off in the 23rd and 24th Dönem to its lowest levels of any time during the years 
under investigation. 
While these patterns in the data pertaining to genel görüşme have been explored in 
detail in the previous chapter, the larger implications and meaning of the data will be 
discussed in this section. First, this section will explore what these patterns indicate overall 
about opposition parties’ ability to expand debate and government’s ability to limit debate 
in the Turkish context as well as what this means for the legislative process in Turkey. 
Second, it will extend upon these observations to inquire into a related takeaway from 
Baumgartner’s framework. Namely, do parties’ expansionary tactics have any influence on 
policy outcomes? 
Is expansion successful? 
 Are Turkish opposition parties successfully utilizing the expansionary tactics that 
are one of their natural legislative functions? Is the government acting to limit debate in the 
way predicted? The data indicates a mixed answer.  
 In some ways, the analysis of incidents of genel görüşme indicates that opposition 
parties are behaving in precisely the manner predicted.  Opposition parties appear to use the 
legislative procedures at their disposal in order to act as the “echo chamber for generating 
controversy” that Baumgartner believes to be a legislature’s most important role. The use 
of legislative process to achieve this goal of obstructing the government’s agenda is of 
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particular importance for our larger question about opposition parties’ role in the 
institutionalization of democratic legislative function; the significance of analyzing 
incidents of genel görüşme is not only that genel görüşme is an expansionary tactic; it is 
that genel görüşme is an institutionalized expansionary tactic. Proposal of genel görüşme 
not only indicates a desire to expand debate, it indicates a willingness to use the rules of the 
game to do so. In this sense, genel görüşme represents not just an expansionary tactic, it 
represents a belief in the legislative process and the institutionalization of the TGNA. The 
legislative tools available to parties have not changed significantly over the thirty plus year 
period under investigation and yet rates of genel görüşme have. Tracking the rise and fall of 
genel görüşme has to potential to cast light on the rise and fall of parties’ belief in the 
utility of the legislative process. 
 In the 1980s, for example, the ANAP government sponsored the large majority of 
the bills that were eventually adopted by the TGNA, an indication that this government, 
like governments before and after it, was “not inclined to use the facilities of the TGNA in 
the law-making process.”33 And yet the continued proposal of genel görüşme on the part of 
opposition parties, suggests a willingness to work within the system, to exercise the 
oversight capabilities constitutionally granted to them, despite the seeming weakness of 
those tools. Indeed, despite not a single proposal of genel görüşme making it past the Board 
of Spokesperson to be even preliminarily debated by the plenary in the 1983 legislature, 
opposition parties in the 1987 legislature more than doubled the number of genel görüşme 
proposals they submitted. Not one of these proposals made it to the plenary either, and yet 
the rate of proposal increased again in the next legislative period. This participation in the 
process despite minimally apparent influence, suggests a willingness to work through the 
procedures granted to the institution of the legislature. 
 In the coalition years of 1991 to 2002, opposition parties also behave as predicted in 
regards to proposal of debate. The fragmented nature of the party system during these years 
created an opening whereby opposition parties were able to push genel görüşme onto the 
floor of the plenary to be debated, suggesting not only a desire to expand debate but some 
success in their ability to do so. Furthermore, when opposition parties did succeed in taking 
                                                          
33
  Kalaycıoğlu 1990: p. 202 
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advantage of the governing coalition’s lack of ability to limit debate, there was a possibility 
of communicating that expansionary message to the public. The media did not universally 
cover genel görüşme, but it does appear that for the debates that parties deemed the most 
important, namely those which they spent the most time debating in the plenary, the media 
provide an increased level of coverage.  
 This is not to say that opposition parties were not also attempting to work outside or 
around the process to counter the parties in power. Indeed, the rate of physical altercations 
on the floor of the TGNA during this period are one very visible indicator that methods 
outside of the legislative process were employed with enthusiasm and consistency.  
However, the continued use of legislative tools such as genel görüşme in addition to all 
other methods does suggest deputies were also using the system to attempt to expand 
debate and attract public attention. 
 On the other hand, parties do exhibit behaviors that are not in line with what 
Baumgartner would predict in a democratically functioning legislative system. The tapering 
off of genel görüşme in the past three legislative periods implies a curtailing of 
institutionalized conflict and expansion in the legislative process. While the return to party 
government did mean the government was more able to implement a unified strategy to 
limit debate, the fact that opposition parties have ceased to even propose debate suggests a 
lack of faith in the legislative procedures given to them. During the party government 
period of the 1980s, opposition parties were all but unable to get debate on the floor, yet it 
did not stop them from proposing it. In comparison, opposition parties’ behavior in the last 
two legislative periods suggests a lack of belief in genel görüşme as a useful tool, and by 
extension suggests a potential lessening of belief in the legislative process.  
 Interviews with opposition deputies support this theory. In reference to genel 
görüşme, one main opposition CHP deputy serving in the 24th Dönem suggested that genel 
görüşme is simply not worth the time, going so far as to suggest that legislative procedures 
across the board have been sidelined and that legislative function has been undermined:  
“The disappearance of genel görüşme, and also the disappearance of 
participatory democracy at the level of the parliament are signs of the 
diminishing parliamentarism in Turkey. Meaning increasingly the executive 
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has full control over all aspects of legislation. I would argue that 
parliament’s role as well as individual MPs role – whether in the opposition 
or the government – are deteriorating over the years” 
Another CHP deputy, one of the few deputies who had introduced a motion for 
genel görüşme in the 24th Dönem after working with his party leadership, was disillusioned 
after the process. “Genel görüşme is not that important. That is another mechanism. That 
too doesn’t work.” Though he did qualify this sentiment later in the interview when asked 
if he believed genel görüşme had any ability at all to influence the views of the public, 
saying “Not necessarily on a one on one result of a genel görüşme. But as a combination of 
statements made to the press, on television, and it piles up.” 
A deputy from the MHP pointed to the governing AK Party’s ability to limit debate, 
suggesting that it made parliamentary function and genel görüşme irrelevant: 
“The AK Party government, they have a big majority in parliament, it 
prevents proper parliamentary work in general. Also about [genel görüşme], 
they reject it, they don’t look at if it is necessary or not, or if it is a 
reasonable offer or not.” 
The sentiment that the current distribution of power prevents the legislature from operating 
as intended was one that appeared in several interviews. Opposition deputies did not just 
lament their party’s lack of ability to influence policy, they lamented that their lack of 
ability to influence the process was due to a breakdown of the proper functioning of the 
legislative institution.   
 Lest it be argued that these opinions merely reflect the fact that genel görüşme has 
gone out of fashion among legislators and political parties, it should be noted that the 
deputies’ observations on genel görüşme also led them to reflect on the other parliamentary 
institutions that they thought were malfunctioning in a similar way. More than one deputy 
remarked that the government, in comparison with previous legislative periods, no longer 
responds to oral questions from the opposition in a timely or complete manner. Another 
noted that legislative oversight of the budget has been curtailed. The irrelevancy of the 
committee process was a theme that emerged in multiple interviews as well. Though only 
rates of genel gorusme were quantified in this thesis, deputies’ attitudes towards other 
legislative institutional practices indicate their belief in an undermining of legislative 
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institutions more generally, and by extension, their lack of belief in the utility of engaging 
in them. 
 The opinions of these deputies are not included as a definitive comment on the 
distribution of power in the political system at the time these interviews were conducted, 
but rather are meant to illuminate opposition deputies’ – and by extension opposition 
parties’ – views of the legislative process. The repeated theme of not believing that the 
legislative process is working is linked to why opposition parties may or may not be 
attempting to use the institutionalized expansionary tactics granted to them. 
 The opposition’s sense of their lack of legislative options cannot be solely attributed 
to the difference between the ways opposition parties perceive their options in party 
government periods versus coalition government periods. The rise AK Party’s 
predominance in the legislative sphere is different than what was observed under the ANAP 
party government. In the later case, opposition parties continued to propose genel gorusme, 
to engage in the process regardless of the relationship to policy outcomes. Opposition 
parties’ expansionary tactics in the 23rd and 24th Dönem, on the other hand, appear to have 
diminished at least in part because parties do not believe these efforts achieve anything.  
Media Climate 
Opposition party deputies’ belief in the lack of purpose of genel görüşme in the 24th 
Dönem is not only because they lack the ability to bring genel görüşme to the floor, but 
also because there is a widespread belief that they are unable to bring their message to the 
public’s attention even should they succeed in using the legislative tools for expansion 
available to them. Opposition parties do not perceive an even-handed media climate that 
would enable them to communicate their message beyond the walls of the TGNA.  
An admitted shortcoming of the data on media amplification of genel görüşme is 
that it does not give a complete picture over the entire time period. Because the incidents of 
genel görüşme that were fully debate occurred primarily during the coalition government 
legislative periods, very little data specific to media expansion of genel görüşme outside of 
those years was not included in the media sample of this study. However, other indicators 
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suggest that the media climate in Turkey at the time of writing this thesis is not fully free.34 
In addition to external measures on the state of media freedom in Turkey, once again 
opposition deputies’ perception of the media climate is telling. Across the board, opposition 
deputies interviewed for this study expressed a belief that opposition parties are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to media access. Deputies expressed the belief that the window 
available to them to get their message out was severely limited on several counts. One CHP 
deputy described her frustration at lack of media attention to what she viewed as valuable 
contributions: 
“[I]n general stuff that opposition parties, or even speeches or press 
interviews and so on, you can call the press and have a press conference – 
these are recorded, but very few channels will show it, or they will not at all 
show it. So a lot of stuff that the opposition introduces never makes it to 
newspapers or electronic media. That is exactly why there is this image that 
my party is doing nothing…it never made it to the press.” 
The same CHP deputy who had introduced one of the few instances of genel 
görüşme in the 24th Dönem described opposition parties’ access to media thus: 
“We get a little space through the parliamentary television. Which, by law, 
must be broadcast by TRT 3, but only until seven o’clock. When the 
government doesn’t want what the opposition says on an issue, they take it 
to Friday or the weekend or they call for closed to camera sessions. The 
voice of the opposition is heard, but only partially. Especially given the state 
of the media. Which is under the strict, overt – and if necessary covert – 
control of the government.” 
This deputy was not alone in implying that the government’s efforts to limit and constrict 
debate were not, as Baumgartner might suggest, achieved through restricting debate to the 
realm of specialists, but rather by altering the rules of the game to limit opposition parties’ 
visibility. Objections to the oppositions’ share of air time on state run media channels or the 
government’s deliberate scheduling of debate for times when it would not be publically 
aired were expressed by multiple deputies. 
 The former ANAP deputy made a direct connection between the media climate 
today a lack willingness on the part of opposition parties to challenge the status quo.  
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“[Journalists] should be an equal distance from all political parties in theory, 
but this is not the case. Now, opposition parties have lost their hope and 
expectations on this front and they do not even complain. They are so 
hopeless that they do not even put effort into changing this situation.” 
A plausible explanation for the decline in opposition party’s expansionary tactics in 
the most recent two legislative periods is both a declining belief in the utility of engaging in 
parliamentary procedure as well as a belief that the media climate makes expansion 
unlikely. 
 
Expansion and Policy Outcomes: The Turkish Case 
Thus far, this thesis has focused on the first component of Baumgartner’s theories 
on expansion. It has asked whether or not expansion is happening. The answer to this 
question, as explored above, is mixed, with strong indications that expansion is declining in 
the last two legislative periods. The second question which follows naturally is, when 
expansionary tactics are being used successfully, do they have any effect on the outcome of 
the policymaking process? 
Baumgartner does not claim that legislative debate is enough to change policy 
outcomes in a system that is otherwise dominated by the agenda of the government. Rather, 
he sees debate as a lever by which to instigate or contribute to the magnification of other 
forces that have a combined ability to influence the government. “Parliamentary debate 
may not be enough in itself to push an issue onto the national political agenda, but when 
combined with public demonstrations and other activities outside Parliament it can be very 
effective.”35 Legislative debate is effective when it is part of a larger set of coordinated 
activities. Gaining media attention and elevating an issue in the eyes of the general public is 
achieved by a combination of tactics employed by both legislative and non-legislative 
actors.  
Baumgartner describes the forces at work behind one debate that successfully 
altered a policy outcome by contributing to and capitalizing on public sentiment. In this 
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instance, a bill altering medical school training requirements had passed through parliament 
with the input of only a handful of specialists and very little debate. After passage, there 
was a large public outcry led by the medical students whom the change affected. 
“Parliamentary leaders of the opposition were quick to support the striking medical 
students and used the forum of parliamentary debate as a mechanism for generating 
publicity for their cause.”36 The efforts of opposition leaders in combination with the highly 
visible demands of the students  “created a major national issue on a topic that, months 
before, had been voted through Parliament with the sustained interest of only a handful of 
legislators”37 In the end, the legislation was amended. Opposition party leaders’ 
expansionary tactics mattered, not because they were able to force a change on their own 
purely through the legislative process, but rather because they created a bridge between 
popular dissatisfaction and the policymaking process.   
 Surveying the Turkish case over the past thirty years, what can be inferred about the 
linkage between legislative and non-legislative actors whose interests and policy 
preferences align? Do we see the linkage between political parties and other shapers of 
public sentiment that are an essential component of expanders’ ability to affect policy 
outcomes?  
 Prior to 1995, the undermining of these connections between political parties and 
other societal actors was deliberate. A measure in the 1982 Constitution forbid cooperation 
between political parties and other stakeholders such as professional organizations, 
foundations, associations, and cooperative societies.38 This official ban was lifted by 
constitutional changes passed in 1995, but in some ways the ban had been a codification of 
an established pattern; writing in 2000 Özbudun notes that the linkages between political 
parties and civil society institutions were never strong and were then further weakened by 
the provisions on the 1982 Constitution. He further suggests a lack robustness in these 
linkages even after the ban was lifted. The coordination of political goals as a key driver of 
political parties’ ability to effect change is inhibited in the Turkish case by an extended 
tradition of low linkage.    
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My interviews revealed this lack of linkage and coordinated momentum between 
legislative and non-legislative actors is perceived by opposition legislators to be a problem. 
In the words of the current deputies that I interviewed, attempts at expansion are not 
matched by or coordinated with other societal currents that would aid in propelling an issue 
onto the national stage.  
My first round of interviews was conducted in the midst of a weeks-long debate 
over a controversial security bill. The exploration of deputies’ perceptions of the debate 
reveal broader attitudes about the likelihood of the expansionary tactics they were using 
affecting public opinion. In this debate, all three opposition parties were against the bill and 
all attempted to forestall the bill’s passage. These attempts to affect the outcome of the bill 
took the form of procedural and institutionalized means, as well as non-procedural means 
including fist fights on the floor of the plenary and “activist-style demonstrations” by 
deputies in the chamber.39 Several of the deputies interviewed while this debate was 
ongoing thought the media coverage of the debate was greater than the coverage received 
by other debates, and had hopes that it was informing the public and could alter the course 
of the bill’s passage: 
I think our resistance in the parliament first of all shows people there is a 
problem. Second, hopefully we are able to get across some of our main 
points – about why the bill is such a bad idea for the democratization and EU 
process and Kurdish peace process, and hopefully a few of the articles have 
already been dropped, but maybe it will help us bring the government back 
to the negotiation table. 
Despite this deputy’s cautious optimism, he accompanied this statement with an expression 
of dissatisfaction that there was not a public outcry to match the efforts of opposition party 
deputies. 
To be frank, it is disappointing to see that there is not much of a public 
outrage about the bill. I would argue that in any of the EU countries, such a 
draft bill right from the start would lead to millions of people protesting on 
the streets – including by members of the ruling party.  
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He posits that this type of linkage and buy in from other actors is not possible because civil 
society, businesses and individuals fear punitive measures or loss of privilege if they 
oppose the government.   
 Another CHP deputy, when asked if he believed debate in the TGNA had any 
ability to change the public discussion about the topic being debated responded: 
“No, not the direction and the critical end result of that discussion. But if 
history is important at all, you put yourself on record of saying I warned you, 
I drew your attention to this critical deficiency. Perhaps this kind of 
satisfaction.” 
This assessment, that opposition parties’ contributions will enable history to vindicate their 
efforts as opposed to affecting the present reality of policy suggest a grim self-assessment 
of what they as parties are capable of doing. This same deputy provided an even more 
candid and cynical take on the role of opposition parties in Turkish democracy, saying 
“Opposition parties are certainly not irrelevant, in the sense that we give the façade still of a 
functioning democracy, of different political parties.”  
 
Expansion or Instability? 
The intersection of expansion through political conflict and institutionalization of a 
democratic political system is one that deserves unpacking. Looking at the data from 1983 
to the present, periods of heightened expansion and periods of heightened instability appear 
to be roughly correlated: The 1990’s was a period in which the institutional procedures the 
TGNA were used with greater frequency to expand political debate. The 1990’s was also a 
period in which political power was so fragmented and dispersed as to severely undermine 
effective governing. What is the relationship between expansion and instability? In the 
Turkish case is expansion a mark of institutionalization and democratic function, or merely 
mark of instability? 
Baumgartner argues that expansion driven by political conflict is an important 
democratic tool in a restrictive political system, a way for voices that would otherwise be 
excluded from the policymaking sphere to have a say. But too much conflict equals no 
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policy, equals an inability govern, equals a failed political system. This is an all too familiar 
scenario in the Turkish case:    
The overall picture of the process of democratization and legislative 
institutionalization in Turkey seems rather bleak. Every trial since 1946 
seems to follow a definite cyclical pattern: a new political regime, or a 
constitution that emphasizes multi-party parliamentarianism is initiated by 
the ‘state elite.’ Conflict among the major contenders for power and political 
position…gradually intensifies….The mounting tensions pave the way for 
political protests, demonstrations, strikes and even the use of firearms in the 
struggle for political power. The TGNA fails to perform as a conflict-
resolving arena, and perhaps even helps to exacerbate political tensions.”40  
This is the dark alter-reality of the process of conflict that Baumgartner describes. One in 
which the political system cannot contain or channel the conflict generated in its 
institutions and on the streets and the result is a complete breakdown of democracy, 
certainly not an enhancement of it. Where is the balance between democratic legislative 
activity that gives a voice to minority opinions even when institutional arrangements are 
stacked in favor of a strong government and between fragmented, unstable institutions in 
which effective governing is hobbled?  
 It is important to recollect the reasons why Baumgartner deems political conflict 
and expansion essential elements in a functioning democracy. Without conflict, he says, 
“subgovernments” of policy specialists come to exist and as a result, policy matters are 
determined primarily by actors who have a vested interest in the programs they are 
creating. Specialists are often drawn from outside the ranks of political actors, though they 
can be acting with the explicit approval of political leaders. Specialists can include 
bureaucrats, interests groups and technical experts. If left unchecked, these small groups of 
specialists can then dominate the policy process and it becomes easier for them to control 
what is produced and legislated. However, with the strategy of expansion, when an issue 
that resonates with the general public is altered, it is possible to wrest some control from 
these specialized subgroups of vested interests. “Even a minority can protect itself from an 
encroaching majority, if it is able to use the strategy of expansion to its benefit.” When 
conflict is working successfully, “no single group of actors controls the process, and each 
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side engages in a rhetorical battle over the terms of the debate and the proper arena for the 
controversy.” 41 
 Baumgartner, however, readily acknowledges that too much conflict is bad.42 
Generating conflict for the sake of conflict can subsume the entire policy agenda and take 
up political leaders’ time and attention with issues that may be of less societal importance. 
Expansion can derail policy proposals that are beneficial and slow down the policymaking 
process to a degree that makes effective governing impossible.       
“The trick,” Baumgartner mentions in his concluding remarks, “is to find a system 
that allows decisions to be made in a routine and efficient manner on most issues but 
focuses national attention and public debate on certain others….”43 The strategies of 
expansion and contraction, when working as ideally envisioned, should enable policy 
makers to act in areas of consensus, and broaden participation in areas of conflict. 
 This balance between consensus driven governance and conflict driven participation 
is one that has been historically difficult to achieve in the Turkish political system.  In the 
thirty plus years for which data was gathered for this thesis, we have examples of  what too 
much conflict and too little conflict in policymaking look like. 
The Nature of Conflict in Coalition Times 
The coalition period of 1991 to 2002 provides an opportunity to investigate the 
implications of a high level of legislative conflict. During this time, we observe the greatest 
level of successful expansionary techniques as measured by the institutional conflict-
generating tool of genel görüşme. However, despite this use of institutional avenues for 
expansion, this period is not spoken of as a period of robust democratic participation in 
policy making. Şebnem Gümüşcü goes so far as to describe these years of fragmentation 
and inefficient policy formation as a “lost decade.”44 Sabri Sayarı describes this period as 
one in which party system fragmentation and infighting prevented effective governance: 
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“The dispersion and fragmentation of political power, coupled with volatile 
 parliamentary majorities, proved to be highly detrimental to policy formulation, 
 implementation, and continuity, especially in the period from 1995 to 1999 when 
 Turkey witnessed the rise and fall of six coalition or minority governments in quick 
 succession.” 45 
He goes on to say that this weakness and instability had a significant impact on the 
functioning of democracy during these years. 
 In this period, political conflict was not feeding into the political system as a way to 
amplify unheard voices, rather generating conflict was a means to hobble the government 
and an excellent means for opposition parties to further their own aims, most notably 
bringing down current governments and coming into power themselves. When conflict and 
expansion are used in this way, expansion becomes less about altering policy outcomes and 
more about winning at all costs.  
Expansion through legislative procedure can be an indication of respect for 
legislative process and institutions, or it can be yet another way to put to use legislative 
tools and procedures for the purpose of forwarding self-serving goals. Ilter Turan points to 
the government’s access to public resources as patronage and the opposition’s lack of such 
resources as a challenge for opposition parties who are working to keep their members 
from switching sides to gain access to government resources.  
“For such reasons, much opposition energy is devoted to finding ways to 
undermine the existing government: encouraging disharmony within it, 
standing in the way of its getting anything done by paralyzing the 
functioning of the parliament…and persistently challenging the legitimacy 
of the government. In this struggle, parliamentary procedures and 
instruments are used for purposes other than those for which they were 
intended.”46  
Insecure deputies looking to achieve outcomes beneficial to themselves may use 
institutional tools to achieve their goals – not in a way that advances democratic 
institutionalization in the TGNA but in a way that hinders it.  
This paints a very bleak picture of the legislature in the 1990s. But this study’s 
earlier findings regarding opposition party’s use of legislative process cannot be summarily 
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dismissed with the claim that opposition parties were simply using the rules of the game to 
subvert the game itself. The indicators of institutionalization of conflict that the data on 
genel görüşme show are matched in the literature by authors pointing to other 
complimentary indicators of institutionalization and democratic consolidation during this 
period. 
 As much as party fragmentation and instability were realities of the political system 
during the coalition legislative periods, institutionalization and democratic functioning did 
not grind to a halt. The question motivating Turan’s research in the same article quoted 
above in which he lays bare the self interested practices of deputies, was whether legislative 
institutionalization can progress in an unstable political systems.  Writing in 2003 with the 
period of fragmentation and coalition governments fresh in mind, Turan ultimately 
concludes that the TGNA had nonetheless become more institutionalized over time and had 
been an agent of democratic consolidation: “Governments feel obliged to operate within the 
prescribed set of laws and procedures in matters involving the legislature.”47 Even in a time 
of political instability, the institution of the TGNA played a central role, and even in less 
that optimum circumstances continued to conduct business. 
 The visible aspects of fragmentation and policy obstruction in the 1990s may create 
the perception of a “lost decade”, but the coalition years were not uniformly dysfunctional. 
Kalaycıoğlu, writing in 1995 looking back on the 1991 legislature, observed that the TGNA 
was a more autonomous and effective body than its incarnations that had come before, 
writing that “[i]t seems as if the Government wields less control over the TGNA than any 
previous Government of the 1970s and the 1980s.”48 He writes also that despite the 
seeming intention of the 1982 Constitution, “the TGNA failed to become just a rubber 
stamp institution.”49 In 1995 there was even sufficient intra-party cooperation to amend 
some of the more undemocratic measures of the 1982 Constitution. That the years directly 
following the publication of this article would become more volatile and unstable does not 
undermine the observation that the TGNA between 1991 and 1995 showed signs of 
institutionalization and autonomy.  
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 The patterns of institutionalized conflict and expansion observed in the 19th, 20th 
and 21st legislative periods should not be dismissed as an anomaly due to instability in the 
political system at this time. As Turan concludes, movement towards greater 
institutionalization can happen in concurrence with instability in the political system.  
Conflict in a Predominant Party System 
 The indicators that legislators’ use of institutional avenues for conflict expansion is 
tapering off in recent legislative periods provides a converse picture to the one visible in the 
1990s. In contrast to the varying degrees of instability of the coalition period of 1991 to 
2002, the increasing stability of the party system in the past three legislative periods is 
striking. The lower levels of electoral volatility, reduction in party switching and high 
degree of party discipline are markers of the rise of a predominant party system in 
Turkey.50   
The opinions of current opposition deputies included earlier in this thesis make their 
perceptions of the ability of legislators to participate in the policymaking process clear. As 
noted in previous sections, the data on genel görüşme suggests that not only are opposition 
parties less able to successfully expand debate, they have also stopped trying to do so as 
often. The proposal rate of genel görüşme is significantly lower that any period before and 
has progressively decreased. This is notable not only in comparison with the high levels of 
institutionalized conflict and debate proposal in the coalition government legislatures, but 
also in comparison to the party government period of the 1980s. Even though none of the 
more restrictive and undemocratic measures of the 1982 Constitution had yet been 
mitigated by constitutional amendment while the ANAP government was in power from 
1983 to 1991, opposition parties were still proposing expansion through genel gorusme at a 
rate the increased rather than decreased over the two legislative periods concerned. The 
disheartened opposition’s frustration with the institutional tools available to them therefore 
cannot be solely attributed to the opportunities available to opposition parties in party 
government versus coalition periods. The cowing of opposition parties and curtailing of 
opportunities for institutionalized conflict must be attributed to factors other than the 
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behavior of opposition during party government versus coalition government times. The 
political environment under the AK Party government is one in which relatively greater 
stability has been achieved, but at the seeming cost of furthering the democratic 
institutionalization of the TGNA. As Baumgartner says “Policymaking by a small group of 
experts may be more efficient, but few would argue that it is particularly democratic.”51 
The balance between stability and efficiency on one hand, and democracy on the other is a 
balance that continues to be illusive in the Turkish case.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have explored whether opposition parties are able to use 
expansionary techniques to bring issues to the attention of the public in a way that has the 
potential to influence policy perceptions and the direction of the political agenda. 
Furthermore, I have shown that the methods that opposition parties use or do not use to 
create political conflict have implications for the institutionalization of the democratic 
functioning of the Turkish legislature. The data and discussion in previous chapters enables 
us to sketch several conclusions about the function of opposition parties in Turkey’s 
policymaking process. 
First, the function of opposition parties in the Turkish legislative system is not 
consistent across time, nor is there a suggestion of a consistent trend or progression over 
the thirty two years investigated. Opposition parties’ willingness and success in using 
expansionary tactics have differed across government types and legislative periods. At 
times, the predicted expansionary forces and institutionalized conflict have been visible, 
and at other times they have not appeared to be operating as would be predicted in a freely 
functioning legislative system. Since the legislative and electoral institutions of the past 
three decades have been relatively consistent, this suggests that factors other than the 
design of institutional arrangements influence the role opposition parties play in the 
legislature. This further suggests that in times where opposition parties do not appear to be 
fulfilling the expansionary function that would be predicted of them, this is not merely due 
to overly restrictive institutional arrangements. 
Baumgartner’s framework has demonstrated that expansionary techniques can be 
effectively employed even in some political systems where institutions are arranged to 
restrict the input of opposition voices. However, Baumgartner’s framework does not appear 
to be capable of fully explaining the Turkish case. This leads to a second finding. Despite 
Baumgartner’s prediction that no institutional barriers are likely to prevent strategic 
policymakers from effectively utilizing the opportunities for expansion and contraction,52 
my investigation indicates that this does not entirely hold up in the Turkish case.  
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The discussion in previous chapters allows a few hypotheses about why this may be 
the case. First, the use of conflict and expansion is undermined in a political system that is 
not fully institutionalized. When patterns of legislative behavior are not yet fully known, 
accepted or valued, political conflict can easily take the form of deputies or parties working 
outside of the given set of institutions. In a fully institutionalized system where the patterns 
and procedures of the legislature are fully respected, opposition parties can use conflict in 
order to work through the system to achieve political and policy goals. When the rules are 
less accepted, political conflict can be a means to subvert or work around the rules, which 
can be damaging to policy formation of any kind. We see this behavior in the 1990s when 
opposition deputies would work to undermine the government by creating discord and 
paralyzing the functioning of the legislature. This type of conflict can call into question the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole, which can hinder progress towards institutionalization. 
We can see the effects of a lack of institutionalization on opposition parties’ options in 
recent legislative periods as well; when the governing party uses its influence to alter 
opposition parties’ access to media or limit coverage of debates, it incentivizes the 
opposition to use uninstitutionalized means of political conflict to gain attention. Multiple 
opposition deputies that I interviewed mentioned the understanding that spectacle – media 
stunts and fist fights –were the best means to get the media’s attention. This is a different 
strategy at work than one in which generalists alter the portrayal of a policy issue in order 
to push it beyond the control of specialists and into the realm of public understanding. 
An additional breakdown in the applicability of Baumgartner’s framework in the 
Turkish case is that the ability to expand issues in a way that influences the political agenda 
is contingent upon sufficient linkages between legislators and outside actors. These types of 
linkages have never been strong in the Turkish case. Opposition parties’ ability to amplify 
their voices in a way that might actually have implications for policy is contingent upon 
finding allies and coordinating efforts to shift the debate surrounding an issue. No matter 
how persistent or successful opposition parties may be in proposing or debating a policy 
issue in the legislature, without that debate being connected with or transformed into a 
larger societal debate that attracts outside actors, the potential for policy impact is minimal. 
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These linkages are also contingent on the strength of the institutions that operate in 
tandem with the legislature. The cause of weak linkages cannot be solely laid at the feet of 
the legislature, but also in the strength of the other institutions that could help to amplify 
political opposition.  In the Turkish case, the strength of other institutions varies across 
time periods, as is the case with the legislature. At times, the Constitutional Court and the 
Presidency have been counter-majoritarian forces balancing the weight of a party 
government with control over the legislature. This was the case in the first term of the AK 
Party’s government when the Constitutional Court overturned a significant number of bills 
passed by the legislature and the president sent back numerous bills to the TGNA for 
reconsideration.53 In this way, when the voices of opposition deputies were frustrated in the 
legislature, there were other outlets capable of generating political conflict and debate over 
proposals of the government. In 2007 Abdullah Gül, a founding member of the AK Party 
ascended to the presidency. Though he renounced his party membership to do so, he did not 
act as an alternate outlet for opposition to the will of the governing party to the degree his 
predecessor had.  
Additionally, affective linkages that amplify opposition voices require a robust civil 
society. Building partnerships and mutually reinforcing strategies to strength opposition 
messages requires that civil society has the capacity and freedom to do so. Turkish civil 
society is not as potent a force in Turkish society as in the French context that Baumgartner 
originally explored. 
Yet a third addendum to Baumgartner’s predicted model is that the media climate 
must be sufficiently free to facilitate the connection between political actors and the court 
of public opinion. While Baumgartner might characterize the French press as “tame,” an 
uncritical press is still a different creature than an un-free press. When opposition parties 
doubt their ability to gain media coverage of their proposals or debates the incentive to 
propose them decreases. When the institutional tools granted to opposition parties begin to 
be regarded as irrelevant by those very opposition parties, faith in those tools and the 
legislative system more broadly may begin to wane.  
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If opposition parties in the three decades studied in this thesis have not been able to 
consistently perform the expansionary function predicted of them, what role are opposition 
parties playing in the Turkish legislative system? In the introduction of this thesis, I noted 
that even in systems where political rules leave a restricted space for opposition parties to 
operate, opposition parties play a vital role in maintaining and consolidating the health of a 
nation’s democracy. In a predominant party system such as Turkey’s between 2011 and 
2015, opposition parties are perhaps especially important barometers of democratic 
consolidation. When the possibility of political turnover is low, opposition parties’ work 
within the system between elections takes on added importance. Opposition parties are the 
natural allies of other losers in the policy process, of the non-political actors whose policy 
preferences do not align with those of the governing party. Opposition parties are an 
institutionalized counterweight to the majority’s will and when incorporated into the 
system, are a means to counter majoritarian tendencies of those in power. When opposition 
parties are cut out, the linkages between minority voices that enable them to assemble an 
effective counter narrative to counter that of the government are undercut as well. In being 
unable to appeal to outside actors and effectively expand debate surrounding a policy issue, 
specialists and those with vested interests in policy outcomes reign without challenge.  
If opposition parties do not feel that the institutional tools granted to them to fulfill 
their role are sufficient, then it undermines the legitimacy of the legislative institution. 
Opposition parties giving up on institutional tools for political conflict are indicative of a 
predominant party strong-arming them out of the system. Giving up on these institutional 
tools is deemed by opposition parties to be a reality of the power distribution of the system, 
but in giving up, they are also giving up on the process. In doing so, they divest their faith 
in the legislative system and weaken it as an institution. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview Questions 
Regarding the ongoing Security Bill debate, what tools are being used to slow down 
passage of the bill? How was this strategy decided upon? Why are these tools not used at 
other times? 
Do you feel the debate on the Security Bill is helping inform the public? Do you feel the 
debate is receiving a sufficient amount of media attention? 
How are decisions regarding what and if to debate made within the party? 
Genel görüşme is a tool that has largely disappeared in recent legislative periods, why do 
you think this has happened? 
Is genel görüşme a tool you or your party would consider using? Why or why not? 
How is it decided who in the party will propose genel görüşme? 
Do you feel your party is able to gain media attention when you want to draw attention to 
an issue? How do you go about this? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
